This aim of this article is to describe, in the Spanish setting, family ownership and to explore how families hold their shares (the use of indirect ownership, pyramids, and cross-shareholdings). It also seeks to describe to what extent cash-flow rights differ from control rights and the degree of the firm's professionalization according to every type of owner category, but especially for families.
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