This study characterizes employee compensation in family owned and managed firms compared to that in nonfamily firms and professionally managed family firms. The general results show that employee compensation differs between firms. This is an important finding because to understand employee compensation designs it is necessary to understand the role of ownership concentration and management composition in the firm, since the compensation components are explicitly defined according to risk sharing and to the interest of the owners, CEO, and employees.
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