This article models ownership concentration, owner preferences, and competitive advantage. It argues that ownership structure and owner preferences can give rise to resources and capabilities that increase firm profits. The model is then used to explain how successful family-controlled businesses (FCBs) differ from firms with less concentrated ownership and less successful FCBs. Because of their ownership concentration and reduced monitoring costs, many FCBs will have a resource surplus. That surplus and the tendency toward long-term investment among some FCBs create unique competitive opportunities under conditions we specify.
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