This article presents an empirical study that uses a sample of 83 small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) based in Northeast Italy. The study analyzes the impact of nonfamily management on the corporate governance structure. We employ an original framework, based on the New Theory of Property Rights, to analyze corporate governance models in SMEs. Moreover, this article offers a definition of flexibility of the corporate governance model. We also analyze the correspondence between corporate governance systems and organizational structures.
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