We set forth the attributes of forgiving business models that entrepreneurs can use to minimize losses while exploiting ideas to launch new ventures. Venture ideas possessing these attributes have greater potential because they can shift risk to resource providers. Thus, the success of a venture partially depends on the market conditions for others, which affects how an opportunity can be exploited. We emphasize combinations of outside options for resource providers together with their market interaction costs. Finally, we discuss the contributions of this research for entrepreneurs, its theoretical implications, and future research possibilities.
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