This commentary focuses on four themes: (1) empirical relevance of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in family firms; (2) complementary theoretical explanations to CSR behavior in family firms; (3) the need for stringent definitions in family business research; and (4) the potential for dual causality between family ownership and more generous CSR policies. Specifically, I argue that agency theory can lead to additional valuable insights about CSR in family firms.
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