This article proposes that the attention allocated by venture capitalists to portfolio companies impacts their performance. The article develops arguments for optimal portfolio size and for the moderating roles of syndication frequency and role. The hypotheses receive support from analyses employing longitudinal data of the leading U.S. venture capital firms. Our results indicate the value of venture capitalist involvement and give guidance for its optimal allocation and syndication.
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