Many organizations, ranging from small entrepreneurial start–ups to large, multi–business and multi–national enterprises, exhibit a family dimension. Although there is much evidence that this familial dimension is pervasive in organizing economic activities, it remains understudied. The articles in this special issue further our understanding of family businesses and how they might be usefully managed and organized at operational and policy levels. They examine important topics—management succession, agency costs in family versus non–family firms, the effects of culture, and family elites in rent–seeking societies—and improve our understanding of the role of family in entrepreneurial wealth creation at both firm and societal levels. Importantly, these papers further our understanding of the contingencies and contexts wherein family based approaches to organizing enterprise might yield advantages or disadvantages.
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