Ethical decision making is vulnerable to the forces of automaticity. People behave differently in the face of a potential loss versus a potential gain, even when the two situations are transparently identical. Across three experiments, decision makers engaged in more unethical behavior if a decision was presented in a loss frame than if the decision was presented in a gain frame. In Experiment 1, participants in the loss-frame condition were more likely to favor gathering “insider information” than were participants in the gain-frame condition. In Experiment 2, negotiators in the loss-frame condition lied more than negotiators in the gain-frame condition. In Experiment 3, the tendency to be less ethical in the loss-frame condition occurred under time pressure and was eliminated through the removal of time pressure.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
CamererC.F. (2000). Prospect theory in the wild: Evidence from the field. In KahnemanD.TverskyA. (Eds.), Choices, values, and frames (pp. 288–300). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
2.
ChughD.BazermanM.BanajiM. (2005). Bounded ethicality as a psychological barrier to recognizing conflicts of interest. In MooreD.CainD.LoewensteinG.BazermanM. (Eds.), Conflict of interest: Challenges and solutions in business, law, medicine, and public policy (pp. 74–95). New York: Cambridge University Press.
3.
DamasioA.R. (1994). Descartes' error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain. New York: Putnam.
4.
DarleyJ.LatanéB. (1968). Bystander intervention in emergencies: Diffusion of responsibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 8, 377–383.
5.
De MartinoB.KumaranD.SeymourB.DolanR.J. (2006). Frames, biases, and rational decision-making in the human brain. Science, 313, 684–687.
6.
FetherstonhaughD.SlovicP.JohnsonS.FriedrichJ. (1997). Insensitivity to the value of human life: A study of psychophysical numbing. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 14, 283–300.
7.
GilbertD.T. (2002). Inferential correction. In GilovichT.GriffinD.KahnemanD. (Eds.), Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment (pp. 167–184). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
8.
GreeneJ.D.HaidtJ. (2002). How (and where) does moral judgment work?Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6, 517–523.
9.
GreeneJ.D.NystromL.E.EngellA.D.DarleyJ.M.CohenJ.D. (2004). The neural bases of cognitive conflict and control in moral judgment. Neuron, 44, 389–400.
10.
HaidtJ. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108, 814–834.
11.
HeathC.LarrickR.P.WuG. (1999). Goals are reference points. Cognitive Psychology, 38, 79–109.
12.
KahnemanD.KnetschJ.L.ThalerR.H. (1990). Experimental tests of the endowment effect and the Coase theorem. Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1325–1348.
13.
KahnemanD.TverskyA. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47, 263–292.
14.
KarpR.GoldD.TanM. (1998). Bullard Houses. In BrettJ.M. (Ed.), Teaching materials for negotiations and decision making, 2008 (p. 12). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, Dispute Resolution Research Center.
15.
KellarisJ.J.BoyleB.A.DahlstromR.F. (1994). Framing and situational ethics. Marketing Letters, 5, 69–75.
16.
KermerD.A.Driver-LinnE.WilsonT.D.GilbertD.T. (2006). Loss aversion is an affective forecasting error. Psychological Science, 17, 649–653.
17.
KuhbergerA. (1998). The influence of framing on risky decisions: A meta-analysis. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 75, 23–55.
18.
LoydD.L.KernM.C.ThompsonL. (2005). Classroom research: Bridging the ivory divide. Academy of Management Learning and Education, 4, 8–21.
19.
MessickD.M.BazermanM.H. (1996). Ethics for the 21st century: A decision making approach. Sloan Management Review, 37, 9–22.
20.
MilgramS. (1974). Obedience to authority: An experimental view. New York: Harper & Row.
21.
NewberryK.J.ReckersP.M.J.WyndeltsR.W. (1993). An examination of tax practitioner decisions: The role of preparer sanctions and framing effects associated with client condition. Journal of Economic Psychology, 14, 439–452.
22.
PetrinovichL.O'NeillP. (1996). Influence of wording and framing effects on moral intuitions. Ethology and Sociobiology, 17, 145–171.
23.
RobinsonR.J.LewickiR.J.DonahueE.M. (2000). Extending and testing a five factor model of ethical and unethical bargaining tactics: Introducing the SINS scale. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 21, 649–664.
24.
SchweitzerM.E.OrdóñezL.DoumaB. (2004). Goal setting as a motivator of unethical behavior. Academy of Management Journal, 47, 422–432.
25.
SlovicP. (2007). If I look at the mass, I will never act: Psychic numbing and genocide. Journal of Judgment and Decision Making, 2, 79–95.
26.
SprancaM.MinskE.BaronJ. (1991). Omission and commission in judgment and choice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 27, 75–105.
27.
StanovichK.E.WestR.F. (2002). Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate? In GilovichT.GriffinD.KahnemanD. (Eds.), Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment (pp. 421–441). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
28.
TenbrunselA.E.Smith-CroweK. (2008). Ethical decision making: Where we've been and where we're going. Academy of Management Annals, 2, 545–607.
29.
TreviñoL.K. (1986). Ethical decision making in organizations: A person-situation interactionist model. Academy of Management Review, 11, 601–617.
30.
TverskyA.KahnemanD. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science, 211, 453–458.
31.
WellerJ.A.LevinI.P.ShivB.BecharaA. (2007). Neural correlates of adaptive decision making for risky gains and losses. Psychological Science, 18, 958–964.
