It is sometimes necessary to guess which probability distribution governs random sampling over a given event space. When the correct guess cannot be deduced from information available about the space, the problem is said to require ampliative inference. The most familiar form of ampliative inference is represented in the principle of maximum entropy. We examine this principle from a descriptive, psychological point of view.
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