This article assesses Thomas Pogge's recent argument that it is sometimes justifiable to harm innocent persons in light of his claims about the causes of global poverty. It argues that if Pogge's two theses are correct then a third thesis follows: that those immiserated by the international system can legitimately resist the institutions responsible for the systemic violations of human rights, even at the cost of grievously harming innocent persons. This article does not assess the validity of Pogge's theses, but draws attention to a neglected topic in the debate on transnational economic justice: the right of resistance.
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