Constitutional reform requires a cautious approach that draws heavily on the theory of institutions. Too often arguments for particular constitutional arrangements are one-dimensional and limited in scope and imagination. This article illustrates this theme by discussing the debate over fixed- and variable-term parliaments, and by offering a somewhat novel argument that focuses on the role of the opposition within a parliamentary system.
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