This article evaluates the potential for the concept of ‘artificial information asymmetry’ to be used in political studies which focus on principal agent theory. We present real-world examples and excerpts from political writings to support our argument that, although artificial information asymmetry appears to be an important factor in principal agent relations, the concept has been underemployed in the political science agency literature. To be able to present more realistic scenarios of delegation, political scientists might be well advised to incorporate the concept so that it can be used in applied research.
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