Political philosophers often worry about the potentially elitist implications of perfectionism as the basis of distributive justice. Richard Arneson challenges this familiar connection between perfectionism and elitism by developing an egalitarian theory of distributive justice with distinctively perfectionist grounds. In this article, I argue that Arneson's theory is implausible, because an egalitarian political morality renders perfectionism either irrelevant or arbitrary.
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