This article maps out the state of affairs of the academic literature which uses procedural spatial voting models to explain legislative decision-making in the European Union. Employing Tsebelis's (1994) article in which the author models the Union's co-operation procedure and using it as a reference point, I show that there is no clarity yet as to which of the several existing procedural model specifications yields the most convincing results. I conclude by suggesting how the current situation could be improved, and that procedural modelling might be integrated with other rational choice theory for a better understanding of the ongoing evolution of the policymaking instruments in the European Union.
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