Recent, influential theories of liberalism have attempted to maximise respect for the diversity in conceptions of the good life by trying to purge the justifications for their own political principles of any controversial ideal. This paper argues that this wel-meaning move ought to be resisted, as it undermines liberalism's ability to defend and promote itself.
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