AxelrodR, (1984), The Evolution of Co-operation (New York, Basic Books).
2.
DawkinsR, (1976), The Selfish Gene (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
3.
ElsterJ, (1985), Making Sense of Marx (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
4.
HeathAJowellRCurticeJ, (1985), How Britain Votes (Oxford, Pergamon).
5.
JessopB, (1977), ‘Recent Theories of the Capitalist State’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol 1, pp 353–73.
6.
RikerW, (1980), ‘Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions’, American Political Science Review, Vol 21, pp 432–46.
7.
RikerW, (1982), Liberalism Against Populism (San Francisco, W H Freeman).
8.
RoemerJ, (1982), ‘Property Relations vs. Surplus Value in Marxian Exploitation’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol 11, pp 281–313.
ShepsleK, (1979), ‘Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models’, American Journal of Political Science, Vol 23, pp 27–59.
11.
ShepsleKWeingastB, (1981), ‘Structure-induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice’, Public Choice, Vol 37, pp 503–19.
12.
ShubikM, (1984), Game Theory in the Social Sciences (Cambridge Mass., MIT Press).
