The Situationality of Moral Judgement and the Limits of Political Philosophy

Abstract

The quest for the good polity is traditionally a central concern of political philosophy. The traditional and arguably most common way political philosophy engages in this quest, which I shall refer to as the theoretical approach, is by interpreting and working out, in theory, the requirements of morality within the sphere of politics. Such theoretical efforts usually result in certain principles, which prescribe how political institutions ought to act in concrete situations. According to this approach, the possibility to make judgements as to how one ought to act in concrete situations requires antecedent moral principles. In the absence of such principles there is no rational basis for making such judgements. This article first argues against this view of the role of principles in moral judgement. It argues that the possibility to make judgements as to how one ought to act in concrete situations implies: (1) that the situations about which we make such judgements must already have moral significance independently of the principles one may bring to bear upon them; and (2) that the rightness or wrongness of one's actions in concrete situations depends on this moral significance of situations. It then argues that this inevitable situationality of moral judgement undermines the theoretical approach to the quest for the good polity.