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Abstract

This article focuses on the interplay of risk, trust and the possibility of reliable political knowledge in Locke's political thought. Locke's work captures in a nuanced way the shifting power relations and asymmetries that characterize all trusting relationships, and it supports the insight that we often understand what trust is retroactively – that is, when it is betrayed. The article first delineates Locke's basic assumption that political life is plagued by uncertainty and chaos. It then analyzes his modeling of political relations as a kind of fiduciary trust in light of this assumption, situating prerogative as the limit case of political trust. A consideration of Locke's views on revolution as the moment of broken trust emphasizes that scrutinizing and testing trust, while difficult cognitive work, is a task to be performed continuously in politics. Locke thus presents an account of political agency that emphasizes the crucial role of thought alongside action.

Keywords

John Locke risk trust political knowledge

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The Risks of Political Authority: Trust,Knowledge and Political Agency in Locke's Second Treatise

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