Abstract
In a recent article in Political Studies I presented a critical overview of Paul Hirst's theory of ‘associative democracy’ (Wenman, 2007). I emphasised his proximity to English pluralism and especially to the work of G. D. H. Cole. I argued that — like Cole — Hirst's theory moves in a contradictory fashion between an advocacy of pluralism and the assumption of a unified social purpose which is manifest in his defence of functionalism and corporatism. In their response, also in this journal, Jason Edwards and Kelvin Knight claim that I ‘overstate’ the ‘intellectual continuity between Hirst and the English pluralists’ and so my reading misrepresents the ‘character’ and ‘intent’ of associative democracy (Edwards and Knight, 2008). They make numerous substantive points in support of this view; I address each of them in turn.
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