An individualistic Lockean theory of territory holds that territorial rights are coextensive with and arise from the private property rights of individuals. In this essay I extend and deepen my arguments against this view. This essay is a rejoinder to Hillel Steiner's critique of my earlier arguments against the individualistic Lockean theory of territory.
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