The traditional Lockean account of a state's territorial rights construes them as arising from, and coextensive with, the property rights of whichever set of landowners mutually contract to form that state. The coherence of this individualistic account has recently been challenged by Cara Nine. I argue that the reasons offered in support of that incoherence charge are unpersuasive.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
BlackH. C.NolanJ. R.Nolan-HaleyJ. M. (1990) Black's Law Dictionary, sixth edition. St Paul: West Publishing Company.
2.
BuchananA. (2003) ‘Boundaries: What Liberalism Has to Say’, in BuchananA.MooreM. (eds), States, Nations, and Borders: The Ethics of Making Boundaries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 231−61.
3.
LockeJ. (1967 [1690]) Two Treatises of Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
4.
NineC. (2008) ‘A Lockean Theory of Territory’, Political Studies, 56 (1), 148−65.
5.
PatonG. W. (1972) A Text-book of Jurisprudence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
6.
SmithB. (1997) ‘The Cognitive Geometry of War’, in KollerP.PuhlK. (eds), Current Issues in Political Philosophy. Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, pp. 394−403.
7.
SteinerH. (1994) An Essay on Rights. Oxford: Blackwell.
8.
SteinerH. (1996) ‘Territorial Justice’, in CaneyS.GeorgeD.JonesP. (eds), National Rights, International Obligations. Boulder CO: Westview Press, pp. 139−48.
9.
SteinerH. (1998) ‘Working Rights’, in KramerM.SimmondsN.SteinerH., A Debate Over Rights: Philosophical Enquiries. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 233−301.
