Polity,Economy,Neutrality

Abstract

The liberal doctrine that public institutions be neutral between conceptions of the good is invoked in response to the pluralism of modern society. The response can take two distinct forms: dialogical – pluralism requires a neutral public space for conversation; and non-dialogical pluralism requires a contractual sphere which allows cooperation without conversation. Both reject perfectionist political theories like Aristotle's which holds that the end of political institutions is the good life. Given pluralism, perfectionism entails the coercive imposition of contested conceptions of the good. Against this view, the paper outlines a neglected argument in Aristotle's Politics for pluralism from perfectionist premises. It defends an Aristotelian conception of a pluralist politics and associational civil society. This conception provides a sounder foundation for a public space of conversation than does the appeal to neutrality and it escapes the charge of totalitarianism made by defenders of non-dialogical neutrality.