The Reagan Administration's Foreign Policy,1981—1985: Learning to Live with Uncertainty?

Abstract

The Reagan administration's foreign policy from 1981 to 1985 provides an intriguing test of a central problem faced by foreign-policy-makers: the need to cope with uncertainty in policy formulation and implementation. This article sets out to explore the problem and to formulate propositions about the ways in which policy-makers might respond to it. The argument has three stages: first, it identifies some sources and manifestations of uncertainty in foreign policy; secondly, it develops a framework within which policy-makers' responses to uncertainty can be located; and finally, it applies the framework to Reaganite foreign policy. Two sets of conclusions emerge: first, that it is important to identify ways in which foreign-policy-makers both accept uncertainty and adjust to it; and secondly, that the identification of shifting patterns of response leads to further questions about the ‘learning processes' manifested in policy-making.