Gatekeepers control access to benefits that they do not own. When granted access, their clients incur obligations that take the form of fees owed to the gatekeeper. This paper examines a variety of forms that gatekeeping has historically taken, looking closely at the network positions that gatekeepers have occupied. Not previously resolved is what determines the size of the client's obligation. The theory presented here predicts 1) the size of that obligation from the value to the client of the access sought. It also predicts that 2) to benefit, gatekeepers must monopolize their positions, or, failing monopolization, 3) must organize to form a shared monopoly. In exchange networks, gatekeeping takes the form of “ordering,” a new structural power condition. Resistance equations generate exact quantitative values for hypotheses expressing the three predictions above. Experimental tests in the well-understood context of exchange networks offer strong support for the hypotheses.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
BacharachSamuel B.LawlerEdward J.1980. Power and Politics in Organizations.San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
2.
BacharachSamuel B.LawlerEdward J., eds. 2000. Organizational Politics.Stamford, CT: JAI Press.
3.
BienenstockElisa JayneBonacichPhillip1992. “The Core as a Solution to Exclusionary Networks.”, Social Networks14:231–44.
BlauPeter1956. Bureaucracy in Modern Sociology.Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
6.
BonacichPhillipBienenstockElisa1995. “When Rationality Fails.”, Rationality and Society7:293–320.
7.
BonacichPhillipFriedkinNoah1998. “Unequally Valued Exchange Relations.”, Social Psychology Quarterly61:160–71.
8.
BrennanJohn1981. “Some Experimental Structures.” Pp. 189–204 in Networks, Exchange and Coercion, edited by WillerDavidAndersonBo. New York: Elsevier.
9.
BurawoyMichael1979. Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the Labor Process under Monopoly Capitalism.Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
10.
BurtRonald1992. Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition.Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
11.
CookKaren S.EmersonRichard M.GillmoreMary R.YamagishiToshio1983. “The Distribution of Power in Exchange Networks: Theory and Experimental Results.”, American Journal of Sociology89:275–305.
12.
CookKaren S.YamagishiToshio1992. “Power in Exchange Networks: A Power-Dependence Formulation.”, Social Networks14:245–66.
13.
CookKaren S.MolmLinda D.YamagishiToshio1993. “Exchange Relations and Exchange Networks: Recent Developments in Social Exchange Theory.” Pp. 296–322 in Theoretical Research Programs: Studies in Theory Growth, edited by BergerJosephZelditchMorrisJr. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
14.
De GraziaAlfred1952. Politics and Government.Vol. 2. New York: Collier Books.
15.
EisenstadtS. N.1969. The Political Systems of Empires.New York: Free Press.
16.
EmersonRichard1972a. “Exchange Theory Part 1: A Psychological Basis for Social Exchange.” Pp. 38–57 in Sociological Theories in Progress, vol. 2, edited by BergerJosephZelditchMorrisJr.AndersonBo. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
17.
EmersonRichard1972b. “Exchange Theory Part 2: Exchange Relations and Network Structure.” Pp. 58–87 in Sociological Theories in Progress, vol. 2, edited by BergerJosephZelditchMorrisJr.AndersonBo. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
18.
FinleyM. I.1973. The Ancient Economy.Berkeley CA: University of California Press.
19.
FriedkinNoah E.1992. “An Expected Value Model of Social Power: Predictions for Selected Exchange Networks.”, Social Networks14:213–30.
20.
FriedkinNoah E.1993. “An Expected Value Model of Social Exchange Outcomes.” Pp. 163–93 in Advances in Group Processes, vol. 10, edited by LawlerE. J.MarkovskyB.HeimerK.O'BrienJ.. Greenwich CT: JAI Press.
21.
GilhamSteven A.1981. “State, Law and Modern Economic Exchange.” Pp. 129–52 in Networks, Exchange and Coercion, edited by WillerDavidAndersonBo. New York: Elsevier/Greenwood.
22.
GrannovetterMark S.1973. “The Strength of Weak Ties.”, American Journal of Sociology78:1360–80.
23.
GuestRobert H.1962. Organizational Change: The Effect of Successful Leadership.Homewood, IL: Dorsey.
24.
KentDale1978. The Rise of the Medici: Faction in Florence, 1426–1434.New York: Oxford University Press.
25.
KentDale1987. “‘The Dynamic of Power in Cosimo de’ Medici's Florence.” Pp. 63–77 in Patronage, Art and Society in Renaissance Italy, edited by KentF. W.SimonsPatriciaEadeJ. C.. Canberra: Humanities Research Center.
26.
LovagliaMichaelSkvoretzJohnWillerDavidMarkovskyBarry1995. “Negotiated Outcomes in Social Exchange Networks.”, Social Forces74:123–55.
27.
LytleGuy Fitch1987. “Friendship and Patronage in Renaissance Europe.” Pp. 47–61 in Patronage, Art, and Society in Renaissance Italy, edited by KentF. W.SimonsPatriciaEadeJ. C.. Canberra: Humanities Research Center.
28.
MarkovskyBarryWillerDavidPattonTravis1988. “Power Relations in Exchange Networks.”, American Sociological Review53:220–36.
29.
MarsdenPeter V.1983. “Restricted Access in Networks and Models of Power.”, American Journal of Sociology88:686–717.
30.
MolmLinda1994. “Dependence and Risk: Transforming the Structure of Social Exchange.”Social Psychology Quarterly57:163–76.
31.
NashJohn F.1950. “The Bargaining Problem.”, Econometrica18:155–62.
32.
NashJohn F.1951. “Non-Cooperative Games.”, Annals of Mathematics54:286–95.
OlsonMancur1965. The Logic of Collective Action.Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
35.
PadgettJ. F.AnsellC. K.1993. “Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400–1434.”, American Journal of Sociology98:1259–319.
36.
PattonTravisWillerDavid1990. “Connection and Power in Centralized Exchange Networks.”, Journal of Mathematical Sociology16:31–49.
37.
SimpsonBrentMacyMichael2001. “Collective Action and Power Inequality: Coalitions in Exchange Networks.”, Social Psychology Quarterly64:88–100.
38.
SimpsonBrentWillerDavid1999. “A New Method for Finding Power Structures.” Pp.270–84 in Network Exchange Theory, edited by WillerDavid. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
39.
SkvoretzJohnWillerDavid1991. “Power in Exchange Networks: Setting and Structure Variations.”, Social Psychology Quarterly54:224–38.
40.
SkvoretzJohnWillerDavid1993. “Exclusion and Power: A Test of Four Theories of Power in Exchange Networks.”, American Sociological Review58:801–18.
41.
SteffensLincoln1931. The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens.New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.
42.
SzmatkaJacekWillerDavid1995. “Exclusion, Inclusion and Compound Connection in Exchange Networks.”, Social Psychology Quarterly58:123–31.
43.
ThyeShane2000. “A Status Value Theory of Power in Exchange Relations.”, American Sociological Review65:407–32.
44.
ThyeShaneLovagliaMichaelMarkovskyBarry1997. “Responses to Social Exchange and Social Exclusion in Networks.”, Social Forces75:1031–49.
45.
WalkerHenry A.ThyeShaneSimpsonBrentLovagliaMichaelWillerDavidMarkovskyBarry2000. “Network Exchange Theory: Recent Developments and New Directions.”, Social Psychology Quarterly63:324–37.
46.
WassermanStanleyFaustKatherine1994. Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications.New York: Cambridge University Press.
47.
WeissmanRonald1987. “Taking Patronage Seriously.” Pp. 25–45 in Patronage, Art and Society in Renaissance Italy, edited by KentF. W.SimonsPatriciaEadeJ. C.. Canberra: Humanities Research Center.
48.
WhyteWilliam Foote1961. Men at Work.Homewood IL: Dorsey Press.
49.
WillerDavid1981. “Quantity and Network Structure.” Pp. 109–27 in Networks, Exchange and Coercion, edited by WillerDavidAndersonBo. New York: Elsevier/Greenwood.
50.
WillerDavid1984. “Analysis and Composition as Theoretic Procedures.”, Journal of Mathematical Sociology10:241–70.
51.
WillerDavid1987. Theory and the Experimental Investigation of Social Structures.New York: Gordon and Breach.
52.
WillerDavid1992. “Predicting Power in Exchange Networks: A Brief History and Introduction to the Issues.”, Social Networks14:187–212.
WillerDavidSkvoretzJohn1997. “Network Connection and Exchange Ratios: Theory, Predictions, and Experimental Tests.” Pp. 199–234 in Advances in Group Process, vol. 14, edited by MarkovskyBarryLovagliaMichaelTroyerLisa. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
55.
WillerDavidSzmatkaJacek1993. “Cross-National Experimental Investigations of Elementary Theory.” Pp. 37–81 in Advances in Group Process, vol. 10, edited by LawlerE. J.MarkovskyB.HeimerK.O'BrienJ.. Greenwich CT. JAI Press.
56.
ZeuthenFrederik1930. Problems of Monopoly and Economic Warfare.London: Routledge & Sons.
