ArkesH.R.
(1991).
Costs and benefits of judgment errors: Implications for debiasing.
Psychological Bulletin,
110, 486–498.
2.
CamererC.HogarthR.
(1999).
The effects of financial incentives in experiments: A review and capital-labor-production framework.
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,
19, 7–42.
3.
CosmidesL.ToobyJ.
(1992).
Cognitive adaptations for social exchange. In
BarkowJ.CosmidesL.ToobyJ. (Eds.),
The adapted mind (pp. 163–228).
New York: Oxford University Press.
4.
DawesR.J.
(1998).
Judgment, decision making, and interference. In
GilbertD.FiskeS.LindseyG. (Eds.),
The handbook of social psychology (pp. 497–548).
Boston: McGraw-Hill.
5.
FischhoffB.
(1975).
Hindsight ≠ foresight: The effect of outcome knowledge on judgment under uncertainty.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance,
1, 288–299.
6.
GigerenzerG.
(1996).
Rationality: Why social context matters. In
BaltesP.StaudingerU.M. (Eds.),
Interactive minds: Life-span perspectives on the social foundation of cognition (pp. 319–346).
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
7.
GigerenzerG.ToddP.,
the ABC Research Group.
(1999).
Simple heuristics that make us smart.
Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
8.
HammondK.
(1996).
Human judgment and social policy.
New York: Oxford University Press.
9.
KagelJ.RothA.
(1995).
The handbook of experimental economics.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
10.
LuceR.D.
(2000).
Utility of gains and losses.
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
11.
MellersB.A.SchwartzA.CookeA.D.J.
(1998).
Judgment and decision making.
Annual Review of Psychology,
49, 447–477.
SmithV.L.
(1991).
Rational choice: The contrast between psychology and economics.
Journal of Political Economics,
99, 877–897.
14.
SunsteinC.R. (Ed.).
(2000).
Behavioral law and economics.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
15.
SuppeF.
(1977).
The structure of scientific theories.
Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
16.
TetlockP.E.
(2000).
Cognitive biases and organizational correctives: Do both disease and cure depend on the ideological beholder?Administrative Science Quarterly,
45, 293–326.
17.
TetlockP.E.LebowN. (in press).
Poking indeterminacy holes in covering laws: The tension between theory-driven and imagination-driven cognition in historical reasoning.
American Political Science Review.
18.
von NeumannJ.MorgensternO.
(1947).
The theory of games and economic behavior.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.