This article examines the issue of party unity in Hong Kong’s Legislative Council (LegCo). By analysing the LegCo roll-call votes, one can see that the voting patterns of its members are characterised by strong party unity. In particular, a cross-party comparison reveals that for the pro-establishment parties, the Liberal Party had a higher level of unity than the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB); for the pro-democracy parties, the Civic Party had a higher level of cohesion than the Democratic Party. Furthermore, this article shows that strong party unity is likely to be the joint product of party discipline and policy homogeneity among partisan members. Based on the empirical results, the article questions the traditional wisdom that party politics in Hong Kong is necessarily underdeveloped for its simple juxtaposition of party politics with the performance of political parties in elections. Instead, it is suggested that for a better understanding of party politics in Hong Kong, due attention should be paid to the legislative process.
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