In this article I examine Rawls's claim that there is no fundamental opposition between political liberalism and republicanism. I contend that Rawls's position is untenable in light of the necessary values and virtues that must accompany republican liberty as non-domination. Furthermore, I examine the ‘regret’ Rawls has toward some of the ‘political virtues’ of his approach and argue that if republicans were to have the same attitude, republican liberty as non-domination would be undermined. I conclude that republicanism is likely to be accompanied by values and virtues that affect the whole of an individual's life and therefore can be said to be a comprehensive doctrine.
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