I examine Seglow's critique (Politics 17(3) 1997) of my assessment of Parekh's theory of operative public values (Politics 16(3) 1996). This examination has four main stages: (a) the rejection of crucial aspects of Seglow's interpretation of my argument, (b) the rejection of his claim that my argument is logically committed to certain other specific positions which I do not support, (c) the rejection of his claim that I my argumentative strategies are misleading, (d) the consideration of possible similarities and disagreements between our respective positive positions on cultural pluralism.
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References
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ParekhB. (1993) ‘The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy’, in HeldD. (ed.), Prospects for Democracy: North, South, East, West, Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 156–75.
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ParekhB. (1994) ‘Cultural Diversity and Liberal Democracy’, in BeethamD. (ed.) Defining and Measuring Democracy, London: Sage Publications, pp. 199–221.
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SeglowJ. (1997) ‘Cultural Authenticity and Liberal Democracy: A reply to Colin Tyler’, Politics17(3), pp. 169–73.
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TylerC. (1996) ‘The Implications of Parekh's Cultural Pluralism’, Politics16(3), pp. 151–7.
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TylerC.(forthcoming) ‘The Evolution of the Epistemic Self: A critique of the evolutionary epistemology of Thomas Hill Green and his followers’, Bradley Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1, Spring.
