Bernard Williams was an ethical sceptic, but he was also a proponent of liberalism. To what extent can one finally be both? This article explores this question through a particular emphasis on Williams, but seeks to draw wider lessons regarding what ethical scepticism should and should not amount to. It shows how ethical scepticism can be reconciled with a commitment to what Williams, following Judith Shklar, called ‘the liberalism of fear’, which is revealed as an ecumenical outlook for different stripes of ethical sceptic. The article concludes by drawing some lessons for the recent ‘realist’ turn in political theory.
BlackburnS. (1998) Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4.
BlackburnS. (2005) Truth: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Allen Lane.
5.
CohenG. A. (2003) ‘Facts and Principles’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 31 (3), 211–245.
6.
EstlundD. (2008) Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
7.
FloydJ.StearsM. (2011) Political Philosophy versus History?Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
8.
ForresterK. (2012) ‘Judith Shklar, Bernard Williams and Political Realism’, European Journal of Political Theory, 11 (3), 247–272.
9.
FrazerE. (2010) ‘What’s Real in Political Philosophy’, Contemporary Political Philosophy, 9 (4), 490–507.
10.
FreedenM. (2012) ‘Interpretative Realism and Prescriptive Realism’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 17 (1), 1–11.
11.
FreyenhagenF. (2011) ‘Taking Reasonable Pluralism Seriously: An Internal Critique of Political Liberalism’, Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 10 (3), 323–342.
12.
FrickerM. (2000) ‘Confidence and Irony’, in HarcourtE. (ed.), Morality, Reflection and Ideology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 87–112.
13.
GeussR. (1981) The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
14.
GeussR. (2008) Philosophy and Real Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
15.
GledhillJ. (2012) ‘Rawls and Realism’, Social Theory and Practice, 38 (1), 55–82.
16.
HallE. (forthcoming) ‘The Basic Legitimation Demand: A Defence’, Political Studies, doi: 10.1111/1467-9248.12070.
17.
HallE. (2014) ‘Contingency, Confidence and Liberalism in the Political Thought of Bernard Williams’, Social Theory and Practice, 40 (4), 545–569.
18.
HonigB.StearsM. (2011) ‘The New Realism: From Modus Vivendi to Justice’, in FloydJ.StearsM. (eds), Political Philosophy versus History?Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 177–205.
19.
JubbR. (forthcoming) ‘Playing Kant at the Court of King Arthur’, Political Studies, doi: 10.1111/1467-9248.12132.
20.
LarmoreC. (2013) ‘What is Political Philosophy?’, Journal of Moral Philosophy, 10 (3), 276–306.
21.
MooreA. W. (2006) ‘Maxims and Thick Ethical Concepts’, Ratio, 19 (2), 129–147.
22.
NietzscheF. (1997) Ansell-PearsonK. (ed.), On the Genealogy of Morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
23.
NietzscheF. (2001) WilliamsB. (ed.), The Gay Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
24.
NietzscheF. (2009) ‘On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense’, in GuessR.NehamasA. (eds), Writings from the Early Notebooks. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 253–264.
25.
PhilpM. (2010) ‘What is to be Done? Political Theory and Political Realism’, European Journal of Political Theory, 9 (4), 466–484.
26.
PhilpM. (2012) ‘Realism without Illusions’, Political Theory, 40 (5), 629–649.
27.
PippinR. (2010) Nietzsche, Psychology and First Philosophy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
28.
RawlsJ. (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.
29.
RawlsJ. (2001) Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
30.
RortyR. (1989) Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
31.
RossiE. (2012) ‘Justice, Legitimacy and (Normative) Authority for Political Realists’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 15 (2), 149–164.
32.
RossiE. (2013) ‘Consensus, Compromise, Justice and Legitimacy’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 16 (4), 557–572.
33.
RossiE.SleatM. (2014) ‘Realism in Normative Political Theory’, Philosophical Compass, 9 (10), 689–701.
34.
SagarP. (forthcoming) ‘Minding the Gap: Bernard Williams and David Hume on Living an Ethical Life’, Journal of Moral Philosophy, 11 (5), 615–638.
35.
SangiovanniA. (2008) ‘Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 16 (2), 137–164.
36.
SangiovanniA. (2009) ‘Normative Political Theory: A Flight from Reality?’, in BellD. (ed.), Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 219–239.
ShklarJ. (1998) ‘The Liberalism of Fear’, in HoffmannS. (ed.), Political Thought and Political Thinkers. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, pp. 3–20.
39.
SigwartH. J. (2013) ‘The Logic of Legitimacy: Ethics in Political Realism’, Review of Politics, 75 (3), 407–432.
40.
SleatM. (2007) ‘Making Sense of Our Political Lives: On the Political Philosophy of Bernard Williams’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 10 (3), 389–398.
41.
SleatM. (2010) ‘Bernard Williams and the Possibility of a Realist Political Theory’, European Journal of Political Theory, 9 (4), 485–503.
42.
SleatM. (2013) Liberal Realism: A Realist Theory of Liberal Politics. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
43.
StearsM. (2005) ‘The Vocation of Political Theory’, European Journal of Political Theory, 4 (4), 325–350.
44.
SwiftA.WhiteS. (2008) ‘Political Theory, Social Science and Real Politics’, in LeopoldD.StearsM. (eds), Political Theory: Methods and Approaches. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 49–69.
45.
WaldronJ. (2013) ‘Political Political Theory: An Inaugural Lecture’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 21 (1), 1–23.
WilliamsB. (1981) Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 54–70.
48.
WilliamsB. (1986) ‘Reply to Simon Blackburn’, Philosophical Books, 27 (4), 206–207.
49.
WilliamsB. (1993 [1985]) Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. London: Routledge.
50.
WilliamsB. (1995a) ‘How Free Does the Will Need to Be?’, in WilliamsB., Making Sense of Humanity and Other Philosophical Papers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3–21.
51.
WilliamsB. (1995b) ‘The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and the Ambitions of Ethics’, in WilliamsB., Making Sense of Humanity and Other Philosophical Papers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 153–171.
52.
WilliamsB. (1999) ‘Seminar with Bernard Williams’, Ethical Persepctives, 6 (3–4), 243–265.
53.
WilliamsB. (2000) ‘Naturalism and Genealogy’, in HarcourtE. (ed.), Morality, Reflection and Ideology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 148–161.
54.
WilliamsB. (2002) Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
55.
WilliamsB. (2005) HawthornG. (ed.), In the Beginning was the Deed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
56.
WilliamsB. (2006a) BurnyeatM. (ed.), A Sense of the Past. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
57.
WilliamsB. (2006b) MooreA. W. (ed.), Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline. Princeton, NJ: University Press.
58.
WilliamsB. (2014) ‘The Need to be Sceptical’, in WilliamsB., Essays and Reviews. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 311–317.
