Sage Journals: Discover world-class research

Abstract

This article examines major human spaceflight (HSF) mishap investigations and the underlying authorities that establish the legal landscape for these investigations. In the next few years, NASA plans to fly 3 new space vehicles that will carry crew. In addition, commercial companies are preparing to send humans on orbital and suborbital flights. Although the mishaps of Apollo 1, Challenger, and Columbia have been studied extensively, applying those lessons to new investigations will be critical to HSF development. Furthermore, the expanding roles of investigative authorities such as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in commercial spaceflight mishaps will add to the complexity. For example, the NTSB was the sole investigation authority for Scaled Composites' SpaceShipTwo mishap in 2014. In the past, NASA conducted mishap investigations based on its inherent authority in the Space Act. However, the 2005 NASA Authorization Act requires a Presidential Commission to investigate HSF mishaps involving loss of crew or loss of vehicle. When future crewed flights to the International Space Station (ISS) have an FAA license, NTSB may conduct the investigation. In contrast, mishaps involving ISS activities may involve agreements between international partners. The legal structure for the ISS specifically provides for cooperation during mishap investigations. When a European Space Agency astronaut had a close call on ISS in 2013, NASA's investigation included observers from international partners. To reconcile these overlapping authorities, different agreements, and to develop a better model for future investigations, we may draw from the experience of civil space investigations and military mishap investigation processes. In military aviation accidents, a safety investigation determines the root cause and a legal investigation focuses on responsibility for mishaps. A different set of legal authorities were involved in more recent FAA-licensed activities, including Orbital's mishap in October 2014 and the SpaceX mishap in June 2015. FAA, NTSB, NASA, and the commercial provider were involved in these mishaps. Having a clear understanding of the legal authorities involved and the role of these investigations will be key in future spaceflight development. This understanding, in turn, will help both NASA and the international commercial space community to develop the most effective investigation model to support the growth of HSF.

Get full access to this article

View all access options for this article.

References

Letter dated February 3, 1967, from NASA Deputy Administrator, Robert Seamans. The authority cited for creating the Apollo 204 Review Board was NASA Management Instruction 8621.1, dated April 14, 1966.

51 U.S.C. § 20101 et seq.

51 U.S.C. § 20113(a).

The Space Act directs NASA to plan, direct, and conduct aeronautical and space activities. 51 U.S.C. § 20112(a)(1). “Aeronautical and space activities” include, within its definition, manned and unmanned space vehicles. 51 U.S.C. §§ 20103(1) and (2).

Executive Order 12546, dated February 3, 1986, created a Presidential Commission to investigate the Space Shuttle Challenger accident.

Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, June 6, 1986, Appendix O, p. 5.

CAIB Report, Volume I, August 2003, Appendix A, p.231.

See Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, Volume V, August 2003, Appendix G.3, pp. 57–68.

10.

CAIB Report, Volume V, August 2003, Appendix G.2, pp. 29–53, Space Shuttle Program Contingency Action Plan.

11.

CAIB Report, Volume V, pp. 29–53.

12.

CAIB Report, Volume I, p. 231.

13.

Report of Apollo 204 Review Board, April 5, 1967. https://history.nasa.gov/Apollo204/summary.pdf

14.

Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, June 6, 1986.

15.

CAIB Report, Volume I, August 2003.

16.

By comparison, the 9/11 Commission, which included government-wide experts and a broad charter and involved over 2900 deaths, produced a report of 567 pages. Both the Challenger and Columbia investigations generated multiple volumes and were well over a thousand pages.

17.

Letter from the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, June 6, 1986.

18.

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, Volume I, August 2003, p. 7.

19.

Investigation into the Apollo 204 Accident, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, Committee on Science and Aeronautics U.S. House of Representatives, 90th Congress, First Session, April 10, 11, 12, 17, 21; May 10, 1967, Volume I.

20.

See https://www.nasa.gov/centers/johnson/news/shuttle/columbia.html

21.

1 U.S.C. § 70701 et seq.

22.

51 U.S.C. § 70702(a).

23.

51 U.S.C. § 70702(a).

24.

51 U.S.C. § 70704.

25.

51 U.S.C. § 70703.

26.

51 U.S.C. § 70701. Note: NASA's investigation boards look for the root cause of the mishap, while intentional acts, such as sabotage, are left to criminal investigative authorities, such as the Inspector General or Department of Justice.

27.

51 U.S.C. § 70704.

28.

See Letter to the President from the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, dated June 6, 1986.

29.

51 U.S.C. § 70704(b)(6).

30.

See Meeting Minutes of the Aerospace Advisory Panel, July 23, 2015, p. 15. https://oiir.hq.nasa.gov/asap/documents/ASAP_Third_Quarterly_Meeting_2015.pdf

31.

See Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Annual Report for 2015, p. 25. https://oiir.hq.nasa.gov/asap/documents/2015_ASAP_Annual_Report.pdf

32.

National Transportation Safety Board, Aerospace Accident Report, In-Flight Breakup During Test Flight Scaled Composites SpaceShipTwo, October 31, 2014.

33.

NTSB Report, p. vi.

34.

NTSB Report, p. 1.

35.

NTSB Report, p. ix.

36.

NTSB Report, p. 1.

37.

NTSB Report, p. 73. The legal memorandum was dated July 2015.

38.

See 49 U.S.C. § 1131(a)(1)(F).

39.

NTSB Report, p. 79.

40.

NTSB Report, p. 78.

41.

NTSB Report, p. 77.

42.

See https://www.nasa.gov/feature/17-commercial-crew-things-to-track-in-2017

43.

See https://www.nasa.gov/feature/17-commercial-crew-things-to-track-in-2017

44.

See MOU between FAA and NASA for Achievement of Mutual Goals in Human Space Transportation, June 4, 2012. Found at: https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/files/NASA-FAAMOU_signed.pdf

45.

See MOU between FAA and NASA.

46.

See MOU between FAA and NASA.

47.

51 U.S.C. § 50904.

48.

See MOU between FAA and NASA.

49.

See NASA News Release dated June 18, 2012. https://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2012/jun/HQ_12-190_NASA-FAA_MOU.html

50.

51 U.S.C. § 70702(a)(3)(B).

51.

51 U.S.C. § 70702(a)(3)(B).

52.

51 U.S.C. § 50917(b)(1)(A).

53.

See 14 CFR § 417.111(g) for the required contents of the AIP.

54.

14 CFR § 415.51.

55.

NTSB Report, p. 73.

56.

NTSB Report, pp. 78–79.

57.

51 U.S.C. § 70702(a)(3)(B).

58.

NTSB Report, pp. 78–79.

59.

Memorandum of Understanding Between the National Transportation Safety Board, Air Force, and Federal Aviation Administration Regarding Space Launch Accidents, September 7, 2004. https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/media/mou_space_launch_accidents.pdf

60.

MOU at Appendix H. Furthermore, two recent cargo mission failures flying to the ISS may help clarify the roles of the FAA, NTSB, NASA, and the commercial provider. In October 2014, Orbital Sciences had a launch failure at Wallops Flight Facility in Virginia. An engine failure on launch caused damage to the launch pad and nearby areas. The FAA licensed the launch for a NASA mission (to resupply ISS). The explosion caused no injuries, the damage fell within impact limit lines, and there was limited damage to private property. Based on these criteria, the NTSB did not investigate. As the licensing authority, the FAA had Orbital Sciences follow the AIP filed with its license to conduct the investigation. In June 2015, SpaceX had a failure during the ascent of its CRS-7 mission. The launch vehicle and payload were a complete loss after an explosion. The FAA licensed this NASA mission to the ISS. In this mishap, there were no injuries and debris fell into the ocean. Again, the NTSB did not investigate. SpaceX followed its AIP and conducted an investigation. In both instances, NASA retained the authority to conduct its own investigation.

61.

SpaceX Announces Plan for Circumlunar Human Mission, Space News, dated February 27, 2017. http://spacenews.com/spacex-announces-plan-for-circumlunar-human-mission

62.

51 U.S.C. § 50901(b)(3).

63.

14 CFR § 401.5.

64.

14 CFR § 401.5.

65.

H.R. 2809, American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/2809/text

66.

H.R. 2809.

67.

H.R. 2809.

68.

NTSB Report, pp. 78–79.

69.

NTSB Report, p. 77.

70.

Mishap Investigation Board for International Space Station EVA Suit Water Intrusion, High Visibility Close Call on July 16, 2013, pp. 8–9. https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/files/Suit_Water_Intrusion_Mishap_Investigation_Report.pdf

71.

EVA MIB Report, p. 12.

72.

EVA MIB Report, p. 27.

73.

EVA MIB Report, p. 27.

74.

EVA MIB Report, p. 28.

75.

EVA MIB Report, pp. 8–9.

76.

See 51 U.S.C. § 70702.

77.

See 51 U.S.C. § 70702.

78.

EVA MIB Report, pp. 140–142.

79.

EVA MIB Report, pp. 14–16.

80.

EVA MIB Report, pp. 14–16.

81.

EVA MIB Report, pp. 14–16.

82.

EVA MIB Report, p. 13.

83.

Memorandum of Understanding Between NASA and ESA Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station, January 29, 1998.

84.

MOU Between NASA and ESA.

85.

EVA MIB Report, p. 13.

86.

EVA MIB Report, p. 13.

87.

This is different from other Boards, which already have members appointed by the President.

88.

See Department of Defense Instruction, 6055.07, Mishap Notification, Investigation, Reporting, and Record Keeping. The Army calls this a collateral investigation (or Army Regulation 15–6 investigation), the Navy calls it a Judge Advocate General Manual (JAGMAN) investigation, and the Air Force calls it an AIB.

89.

AFI 51–204, Safety Investigations and Reports.

90.

AFI 51–503, Aerospace and Ground Accident Investigations.

91.

See 10 U.S.C. § 2254. Under this law, the opinion of the accident investigators cannot be used to establish liability of the United States in a civil or criminal case. NTSB reports cannot be used to establish liability under 49 USC § 1154(b). NASA has no similar authority for excluding its investigation reports.

92.

AFI 51–503, chapter 12, Investigating Space Mishaps.

93.

AFI 51–503, chapter 12, Investigating Space Mishaps.

94.

AFI 51–503, chapter 12. Also, see the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR,” 22 CFR §§ 120–130), which implements the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). The AECA is found at 22 U.S.C. § 2778.

95.

EVA MIB Report.

96.

CAIB Report, Volume V, August 2003, Appendix G.2, pp. 29–53, Space Shuttle Program Contingency Action Plan.

97.

CAIB Report, Volume V, August 2003, Appendix G.2, pp. 29–53, Space Shuttle Program Contingency Action Plan.

98.

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, Volume V, August 2003, Appendix G.3, pp. 57–68.

99.

NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8621.1C, Mishap and Close Call Reporting, Investigating, and Recordkeeping.

100.

NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8621.1C, Mishap and Close Call Reporting, Investigating, and Recordkeeping, Chapter 3.

101.

NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8621.1C, Mishap and Close Call Reporting, Investigating, and Recordkeeping, Chapter 3.

102.

See EVA MIB Report.

103.

NASA Procedural Directive (NPD) 1000.3E, The NASA Organization.

104.

49 U.S.C. § 1131(a).

105.

49 U.S.C. § 1131(a).

106.

49 U.S.C. § 1111(a).

107.

See 49 U.S.C. § 1131(a).

108.

See https://sma.nasa.gov/news/articles/newsitem/2015/12/18/tri-agency-working-group-focuses-on-inter-organization-cooperation

109.

See https://sma.nasa.gov/news/articles/newsitem/2015/12/18/tri-agency-working-group-focuses-on-inter-organization-cooperation

110.

Genesis Mishap Investigation Board Report, https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/149414main_Genesis_MIB.pdf, p. VII

111.

See http://www.spacex.com/news/2016/09/01/anomaly-updates

112.

EVA MIB Report.

113.

EVA MIB Report.

114.

EVA MIB Report.

115.

See EVA MIB Report and https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/files/Hansen_PressConf.pdf

116.

See 22 CFR §§ 120–130.

117.

See Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Annual Report for 2015, p. 25.

118.

See NASA Transition Authorization Act of 2017, Section 838, Human Space Flight Accident Investigations P.L. 115–10, 131 Stat. 71, March 21, 2017. In fact, much has changed since the PC became law in 2005. The Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 has been amended to recognize the role of a new category of space explorer, the Government Astronaut (GA). At the time the law was written, no one had anticipated that government personnel might fly on FAA-licensed spacecraft. The term “GA” was put into law in November 2015. See 51 U.S.C. § 50901 et seq.

119.

See NASA Transition Authorization Act. Notably, the 2017 revision did not even eliminate investigations of the “space shuttle” from its language, which was last flown in July 2011.The three existing space shuttles that have flown in space now reside in museums. Further updates are needed to this law.

120.

See AFI 51–503, chapter 12.

121.

See Executive Order 12546.

122.

See EVA MIB Report and https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/files/Hansen_PressConf.pdf

123.

See EVA MIB Report.

Human Spaceflight Mishap Investigations: Enabling a Better Model for Future NASA and Commercial Investigations

Abstract

Abstract

Get full access to this article

References