Explaining State Response to the Hazardous Waste Problem

Abstract

ABSTRACT

Federal hazardous waste laws are structured to give state governments operational responsibility and policy development opportunity. State response to this has been mixed. Some states have vigorously enacted regulations, forced industry to comply, and allocated money for cleanups. Others have adopted a far more passive style. This research attempts to explain the causes underlying these varying reactions to the hazardous waste issue.

A traditional conception of federalism -- the need-response model provides the orienting focus. Within it, two competing explanations regarding the impact of need are tested. One explanation is that need accelerates state-level hazardous waste policy activity. That is, states with severe problems respond by enacting policy and making expenditures. The second explanation considers need a depressor of state action. In other words, states with severe problems have the least adequate regulatory effort. This research attempts to reconcile the conflicting explanations.

In this work, need is operationalized along three dimensions: the industrial-governmental relationship, the severity of the hazardous waste problem, and the immediate demand for state action. Response has four aspects: program activity, expenditures, commitment, and performance. Using correlational analysis, substantial support is found for need as a primary determinant of response. States with severe hazardous waste problems are responding at higher levels. This pattern does not hold for all of the measures, however. For example, while "severe" hazardous waste states are spending more for corrective actions, this does not mean that they are allocating their own revenues. It is likely to be federal funds that they are using. Need, therefore, may not automatically translate into financial commitment, although it does appear to be linked to program activity and performance.