Abstract
It sometimes seems that genetic engineering is suspect, both to its practitioners and to the general public, because it is perceived as being somehow unnatural. This essay argues, on the basis of an analysis of two senses of “natural,” that there is nothing distinctively morally problematic about genetic engineering, at least on the grounds of its alleged unnaturalness. It does not follow that we cannot distinguish among morally legitimate and morally suspect uses of genetic engineering. But these distinctions can and should be drawn on the basis of the same considerations that enter into the evaluation of particular uses of any other medical procedure.
Overview summary
One of the issues about genetic engineering that constantly resurfaces is that this is an activity that is unnatural. This concern is manifested in the phrases: “creating a Frankenstein” and “playing God.” Despite the elegant arguments in Splicing Life, this apprehension remains. Porter examines the concern from a theological perceptive and concludes that there is no basis for the claim of unnaturalness. However, she does emphasize that morally correct and incorrect uses of genetic engineering need to be identified.
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