To investigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the strategic decisionmaking of leaders with respect to biological weapons, this study employed a prospective simulation technique called Asynchronous Strategic Dynamics Red Teaming. Using an immersive, multimedia simulation conducted remotely and asynchronously, the effort engaged 240 carefully selected and curated expert participants in either biological weapons or the countries of interest (as well as 60 naïve participants). Across our sample of 30 countries, simulated interest in pursuing some type of biological weapons program (defensive or offensive) remained low to moderate. While such interest increased after the simulated onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, it was limited overall, with only a handful of states showing salient increases in offensive biological weapon interest. When directly referencing why their countries might have changed their post-COVID-19 interest in biological weapons, the most commonly cited reasons were: (1) COVID-19 demonstrated the power of biological weapons to disrupt societies and cause large-scale economic harm, and (2) the pandemic revealed either the state's own or its rivals' vulnerability to diseases like COVID-19, as well as an inability to efficiently respond and contain such diseases. In sum, despite a global pandemic with massive consequences, the simulation revealed that most states are not likely to dramatically change their strategic posture regarding pursuit of offensive biological weapons.
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