Abstract
Abstract
Looking back, the beginning of the Flint water crisis seems surreal. Through a series of wrongheadedly antidemocratic and uncritical economic belt-tightening policies, Michigan Governor Rick Snyder, along with the Flint city manager (and some city officials) decided to switch the water supply from Lake Huron—through Detroit—to the Flint River. For those of us living, working, or studying in Flint, we knew such a decision seemed odd, for we knew that the Flint River was, at best, dirty, and more realistically, dangerous. Nevertheless, in the Spring of 2013, governmental officials decided that changing the water supply made the most sense financially. Almost immediately, residents complained of skin irritation, body aches and pains, the bad smell and taste of the water, and so on. City officials told residents that despite the telling signs to the contrary, the water was safe to drink. Finally, a year after the decision was made, the new mayor declared a state of emergency. The truth of the situation finally was revealed: the state government seemed to have hidden life-altering information from the public. The water was toxic, and nobody was told. This article will explore the city's social, economic, and political history and how it relates to the Flint water crisis. I shall use Bill Lawson's notion of social disappointment to describe the general history of Flint in the past 50 or so years and then explain why the Flint water crisis is best described as an affront within the context of social disappointment.
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