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Abstract

Public participation is supposed to contribute to environmental equity by reducing or eliminating institutional bias. However, environmentally unjust siting and permitting decisions continue to be made despite the institutionalization of public participation processes. This study seeks to better understand the legal mechanisms that create the conditions for institutional bias. Biased decisions occur when one stakeholder or interest has greater influence on the decisions made than other important stakeholders. One mechanism that may foster institutional bias is the structure of communicative interaction. This policy analysis focuses on how the law structures communicative interaction between decision makers and stakeholders during the public participation portion of the environmental review process in Massachusetts. I found that the public participation process in Massachusetts creates few opportunities for meaningful interaction between community stakeholders and agency decision makers. The environmental review process, on the whole, is legally structured to provide more frequent and higher quality interactions between the permit applicant and agency staff. While further research is needed to confirm whether biased decisions are in fact occurring, this imbalance in opportunity for meaningful influence may be one mechanism that creates institutional bias. I conclude with recommendations to institutionalize a more equitable legal structure of communicative interaction among all stakeholders during the public participation process.

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The statutes that pertain to environmental review in Massachusetts are MGL 30 Sections 61-62HI was able to obtain a copy of these laws from the Web site maintained by the Massachusetts General Court. Massachusetts General Court, General Laws of Massachusetts: Chapter 30: General Provisions Relative to State Departments, Commissions, Officers and Employeeshttp://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/mgl/gl-30-toc.htm.

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The regulations for the MEPA review process are found in 301 CMR 11 and were obtained from the MEPA office Web siteMassachusetts Environmental Policy Act Office, MEPA Regulations 301 CMR 11.00http://www.mass.gov/envir/mepa/thirdlevelpages/meparegulations/meparegulations.htm.

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This requirement was recently reaffirmed. Sierra Club v. Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Management439 Mass739. 2003.

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MEPA review is also intended to facilitate environmental planning and to assist the decision making processes of other agencies, including permitting agencies, in order to avoid or minimize damage to the environment.

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Public Participation and Communicative Interaction: The Structural Mechanisms of Institutional Bias

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