Abstract
The literature suggests that, from a founding election onwards, voters enter a learning process during which they improve their levels of electoral coordination until they reach an equilibrium. This is expected across all electoral systems. However, this study relies on a large-N, time-series cross-sectional analysis to test the extent to which electoral coordination is influenced by increasingly complex information and task environments. It shows that (1) the road to equilibrium is more difficult for voters under complex electoral rules; and (2) that it is even more difficult for voters under complex electoral rules and conditions of cross-spatial heterogeneity (in this case, low levels of party system nationalization).
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