I propose a new measure of partisan advantage in redistricting. This measure compares the observed seat outcome in each state to a seat benchmark based on the state's jurisdictional map. The jurisdictional seat benchmark for a party is proportional to the share of the population in jurisdictions (counties and towns) won by this party. This jurisdictional benchmark takes into account the state's political geography and is simple to compute. I define a party's Jurisdictional Partisan Advantage as the difference between the seats the party obtains in an election and the seats that correspond to this party according to the jurisdictional benchmark. Using U.S. election data from 2012 to 2020, I find a Jurisdictional Partisan Advantage of 17 House seats to the Republican party. I argue that the Jurisdictional Partisan Advantage in the congressional maps of North Carolina, Utah, and Ohio during the 2011–2020 redistricting cycle was excessive.
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