We use survey experiments to test the validity of judicial assumptions underlying campaign finance regulation. Our evidence supports the key assumption that “appearance of corruption” is directly related to the monetary value of campaign contributions. Contrary to the Court's reasoning in Buckley v. Valeo and Citizens United v. FEC, independent expenditures are more likely to elicit the appearance of corruption than direct contributions, and direct contributions well below the legal limit also create the appearance of corruption. Our findings therefore call into question key legal tenets underlying campaign finance regulation and suggest that the amounts raised by virtually every federal election campaign exceed the threshold required to elicit widespread public perceptions of corruption.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
AgerbergMattias.2019. “The Curse of Knowledge? Education, Corruption, and Politics.” Political Behavior, 41: 369–399.
2.
AldrichJohn, and McGrawKathleen. 2012. “Introduction to the Volume.” In Improving Public Opinion Surveys: Interdisciplinary Innovation and the American National Election Studies, eds. AldrichJohn and McGrawKathleen, 3–8. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
3.
American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR). 2016. Standard Definitions: Final Dispositions of Case Codes and Outcome Rates for Surveys. 9th edition. Washington, DC: AAPOR.
AndersonChristopher J., and TverdovaYuliya V.. 2003. “Corruption, Political Allegiances, and Attitudes Toward Government in Contemporary Democracies.” American Journal of Political Science, 47: 91–109.
6.
AyresWhitfield.2003. “The Reform Act Will Not Reduce the Appearance of Corruption in American Politics.” In Inside the Campaign Finance Battle: Court Testimony on the New Reforms, eds. CorradoAnthony, MannThomas E., and PotterTrevor, 270–277. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
7.
BlassAbby, RobertsBrian, and ShawDaron. 2012. “Corruption, Political Participation and Appetite for Reform: Americans' Assessment of the Role of Money in Politics.” Election Law Journal, 11: 380–398.
8.
BowlerShaun, and DonovanTodd. 2016. “Campaign Money, Congress, and Perceptions of Corruption.” American Politics Research, 44: 272–295.
9.
BradyHenry E.2011. “Causation and Explanation in Social Science.” In The Oxford Handbook of Political Science, ed. GoodinRobert E.. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
BrownRebecca L., and MartinAndrew D.. 2015. “Rhetoric and Reality: Testing the Harm of Campaign Spending.” New York University Law Review, 90: 1066–1094.
EastonDavid.1975. “A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support.” British Journal of Political Science, 5: 435–457.
22.
EscaleresMonica, CalcagnoPeter T., and IIWilliam F. Shugart. 2012. “Corruption and Voter Participation: Evidence from the US States.” Public Finance Review, 40: 789–815.
23.
Federal Election Commission. 2015. “Price Index Adjustments for Contribution and Expenditure Limitations and Lobbyist Bundling Disclosure Threshold.” Federal Register, vol. 80, no. 22: 5750–5752.
24.
Federal Election Commission. 2018. “Price Index Adjustments for Contribution and Expenditure Limitations and Lobbyist Bundling Disclosure Threshold.” Federal Register, vol. 82, no. 29: 6022–6024.
25.
Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. ____; 138 S. Ct. 1916; 201 L. Ed. 2d 313 (2018).
26.
GurrTed.1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
PersilyNathaniel, and LammieKelli. 2004. “Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Finance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 153: 119–180.
37.
PrimoDavid M.2002. “Campaign Finance and Public Opinion: Reformers Versus Reality.” Independent Review, 7: 207–219.
38.
PrimoDavid M., and MilyoJeffrey. 2006. “Campaign Finance Laws and Political Efficacy: Evidence from the States.” Election Law Journal, 5: 23–39.
39.
PrimoDavid M., and MilyoJeffrey. 2020. Campaign Finance and American Democracy: What the Public Really Thinks and Why It Matters. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
40.
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
41.
Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
42.
SarisWillem E., RevillaMelanie, KrosnickJon A., and ShaefferEric M.. 2010. “Comparing Questions with Agree/Disagree Response Options to Questions with Item-Specific Response Options.” Survey Research Methods, 4: 61–79.
43.
SeligsonMitchell.2002. “The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries.” Journal of Politics, 64: 408–433.
44.
ShawDaron, RobertsBrian E., and BaekMijeong. 2021. The Appearance of Corruption: Testing the Supreme Court's Assumptions about Campaign Finance Reform. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
45.
SpencerDouglas M., and TheodoridisAlexander G.. 2020. “‘Appearance of Corruption’: Linking Public Opinion and Campaign Finance Reform.” Election Law Journal, 19: 510–523.
46.
StockemerDaniel, LaMontagneBernadette, and ScruggsLyle. 2013. “Bribes and Ballots: The Impact of Corruption on Voter Turnout in Democracies.” International Political Science Review, 34: 74–90.
47.
TylerTom R.2001. “A Psychological Perspective on the Legitimacy of Institutions and Authorities.” In The Psychology of Legitimacy, eds. JostJohn T. and MajorBrenda. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
48.
U.S. v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
49.
WangChing-Hsing.2016. “Government Performance, Corruption, and Political Trust in East Asia.” Social Science Quarterly, 97: 211–231.
50.
WarrenMark E.2004. “What Does Corruption Mean in a Democracy?” American Journal of Political Science, 48: 328–343.
51.
WarrenMark E.2006. “Democracy and Deceit: Regulating Appearances of Corruption.” American Journal of Political Science, 50: 160–174.
