This article seeks to determine if theories of repeat player behavior from legal and regulatory literature explain outcomes of third-party monitors in the campaign finance context. We compile an original data set to analyze all campaign finance allegations made against candidates for the U.S. Congress from 2006 to 2012. This includes cases originated by third parties as well as from internal Federal Election Commission (FEC) auditing. Cases are coded by allegation type, identity of the individual filing the complaint, and case outcome. We analyze this data in two ways. First, we examine which campaigns produce allegations of campaign finance violations. In accordance with previous literature, we theorize that third-party monitors will be incentivized by partisan interests. We thus hypothesize that third parties are more likely to engage in monitoring and make campaign finance allegations closer to the election, and in competitive races with high levels of spending, whereas neither factor will predict FEC-initiated cases. Our second analysis focuses on case outcomes. Here, we theorize that some third-party monitors will outperform others, with repeat players lodging higher quality complaints than one shotters. We code the validity and triviality of each allegation, as revealed by the adjudication process. Our analysis confirms our expectations that repeat players (parties, interest groups, and incumbent campaigns) outperform one shotters (individuals and challenger campaigns). We find no evidence that electoral incentives affect the quality of the complaints, with null findings that campaign competitiveness and complaint timing correlate with complaint quality.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
AyresIan, and BraithwaiteJohn. 1992. Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
2.
BardachEugene, and KaganRobert A.. 1982. Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
3.
BarnettMichael L., and KingAndrew A.. 2008. “Good Fences Make Good Neighbors: A Longitudinal Analysis of an Industry Self-Regulatory Institution.”. Academy of Management Journal, 51(6): 1150–1170. <https://doi.org/10.5465/AMJ.2008.35732609>.
4.
BinghamLisa B.1997. “On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards.”. McGeorge Law Review, 29(2): 223–260.
5.
BoatrightRobbert G., MoscardelliVincent G., and Vickrey.Clifford D.2020. “Primary Election Timing and Voter Turnout.”. Election Law Journal [Epub ahead of print]; DOI: 10.1089/elj.2019.0583.
CaldeiraGregory. A., and WrightJohn R.. 1988. “Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the US Supreme Court.”. American Political Science Review, 82(4): 1109–1127. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1961752>.
8.
ColvinAlexander J.S., and GoughMark D.. 2015. “Individual Employment Rights Arbitration in the United States: Actors and Outcomes.”. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 68(5): 1019–1042. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0019793915591984>.
9.
CoxGary W.1997. Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Federal Election Commission. 2012b. Guidebook for Complainants and Respondents on the FEC Enforcement Process. May. Washington, DC: Federal Election Commission. <https://transition.fec.gov/em/respondent_guide.pdf>.
FurgerFranco.1997. “Accountability and Systems of Self-Governance: The Case of the Maritime Industry.”. Law and Policy, 19(4): 445–476. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00035>.
20.
GalanterMarc.1974. “Why the “Haves”. Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change.” Law and Society Review 9(1): 95–160.
21.
GarrettR. Sam.2015. “The Federal Election Commission: Enforcement Process and Selected Issues for Congress.”. Congressional Research Service, Report R44319. December 22.
22.
GarrettR. Sam.2016. “Administering Politics: Rediscovering Campaign Finance and Public Administration.”. Administrative Theory & Praxis, 38(3): 188–205. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10841806.2016.1202079>.
23.
GarrettR. Sam.2020. “Federal Election Commission: Membership and Policymaking Quorum, In Brief.” Congressional Research Service. June 24. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45160.pdf> (accessed July27, 2020).
24.
GaskinsBen, SeljanEllen, LochnerTodd, KowalKatie, DundonZane, and GoldMaya. 2019. “From the FEC to the Ballot Box: Voter Accountability for Campaign Finance Law Violations.”. American Politics Research, 47(5): 1000–1035. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X18759641>.
HeckmanJames J.1976. “The Common Structure of Statistical Models of Truncation, Sample
29.
Selection and Limited Dependent Variables and a Simple Estimator for Such Models.” Annals of Economic and Social Measurement 5(4): 475–492.
30.
JacobsonGary C.2015. “It's Nothing Personal: The Decline of the Incumbency Advantage in US House Elections.”. Journal of Politics, 77(3): 861–873. <https://doi.org/10.1086/681670>.
31.
KindreeTaren, and SchmidtPatrick. 2019. “Campaign Treasurers and Disclosure: Requiem for a Third-Party Gatekeeper Strategy?”. Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics and Policy, 18(2): 145–159. <https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2018.0502>.
32.
KraakmanReinier H.1986. “Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy.”. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2(1): 53–104. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036906>.
33.
La ForgeAmanda S.1996. “The Toothless Tiger-Structural, Political and Legal Barriers to Effective FEC Enforcement: An Overview and Recommendations.”. American University Administrative Law Journal, 10: 351–384.
LochnerTodd, ApollonioDorie, and TatumRhett. 2008. “Wheat from Chaff: Third-Party Monitoring and FEC Enforcement Actions.”. Regulation and Governance, 2(2): 216–233. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-5991.2008.00035.x>.
38.
McCubbinsMathew D., and SchwartzThomas. 1984. “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms.”. American Journal of Political Science, 28(1): 165–179. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2110792>.
39.
McGrawKathleen M., and ScholzJohn T.. 1991. “Appeals to Civic Virtue Versus Attention to Self-Interest: Effects on Tax Compliance”. Law and Society Review, 25(3): 471–498. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3053724>.
O'RourkeDara.2003. “Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of Labor Standards and Monitoring.”. Policy Studies Journal, 31(1): 1–29. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1541-0072.00001>.
42.
PotoskiMatthew, and PrakashAseem. 2005. “Green Clubs and Voluntary Governance: ISO 14001 and Firms' Regulatory Compliance.”. American Journal of Political Science, 49(2): 235–248. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3647674>.
SongerDonald, KuerstenAshlyn, and KahenyErin. 2000. “Why the Haves Don't Always Come Out Ahead: Repeat Players Meet Amici Curiae for the Disadvantaged.”. Political Research Quarterly, 53(3): 537–556. <https://doi.org/10.2307/449197>.
47.
ToffelMichael W.2005. “Resolving Information Asymmetries in Markets: The Role of Certified Management Programs.” UC Berkeley Center for Responsible Business Working Paper. <https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9qh5r011>.
48.
TokajiDaniel P.2018. “Beyond Repair: FEC Reform and Deadlock Deference.” In Democracy by the People, eds. Eugene D. Mazo and Timothy K. Kuhner, 172–200. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
49.
WeilDavid.2005. “Public Enforcement/Private Monitoring: Evaluating a New Approach to Regulating the Minimum Wage.”. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 58(2): 238–257. <https://doi.org/10.1177/001979390505800204>.
50.
WheelerStanton, CartwrightBliss, KaganRobert A., and FriedmanLawrence M.. 1987. “Do the Haves Come Out Ahead? Winning and Losing in State Supreme Courts, 1870–1970.”. Law and Society Review, 21(3): 403–445. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3053377>.
51.
WinterSoren C., and MayPeter J.. 2001. “Motivation for Compliance with Environmental Regulations.”. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 20(4): 675–698. <https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.1023>.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
