That transparency is a powerful check on corruption is an article of faith among many reformers, but in fact such benefits are elusive. Transparency can underwrite general accountability and political education and reveal some situational risks of corruption. But transparency policies miss much of what concerns many Americans about the influence of political money. Such policies are less likely to deter, or to spur effective responses to, outright corruption than we may assume. Moreover, transparency sometimes does more to help already-influential interests protect their advantages than to empower citizens. Finally, for transparency to check corruption, the data it reveals must be used in organized and focused ways, but collective action problems frequently intervene. Possible alternatives may be counterintuitive—for example, making campaign contributions anonymous and unverifiable. Ultimately it is difficult to show that transparency in campaign financing has restrained corruption, particularly if we consider the flows of funds it reveals in the context of the broader inequalities of politics and society.
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