While the need to fund election campaigns may lead candidates to compromise their integrity by obtaining illegal funding or using their public office to “sell” favors to wealthy donors, attempts to influence sitting public officials through illegal or unethical means often do not involve party financing. In politics and government, private and public interests intersect in myriad ways in diverse settings, often bearing the potential of unethical behavior and corruption. From this perspective, many countries have adopted more comprehensive policy frameworks to regulate political ethics since the 1970s. Comparing the history of those reforms in Canada and France, we looked for similarities and differences in the factors that triggered legislative changes, the timing and politics of these reforms, as well as some of the characteristics of the adopted measures. We show that 1) there has been a significant expansion of the legislative framework regulating political ethics in both countries over this period, especially over the last 15 years; 2) the combination of media scrutiny, scandals, and party competition has been an essential trigger for reforms in both countries; 3) in addition to politicians, new nongovernmental integrity advocates and expert commissions have played a significant role in the politics of the reform of the last 15 years; and 4) while the regulatory frameworks currently in place in both countries are much more elaborate and intrusive than in the past, they still comprise few possibilities of sanctions and suffer from weak and uneven enforcement.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
CartyR.K., WilliamCross, and LisaYoung. (2000). Rebuilding Canadian Party Politics. , Vancouver: UBC Press.
2.
CollombatBenoît and ServenayDavid. (2012). “Campagnes de Chirac et de Balladur en 1995: souvenirs d'une arnaque,” Les inrockuptibles (electronic edition), Feb.23, 2012.
3.
Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities. (2006). Restoring Accountability: Recommendations, Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services.
4.
DawoodYasmin. (2015). “Campaign Finance and American Democracy,” Annual Review of Political Science, vol.18, 329–348.
5.
DimaggioPaul J. and PowellWalter W.. (1983). “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields,” American Sociological Review, vol.48, no.2, 147–60.
6.
Engels, JensIvo, SilviaMarton, and FrédéricMonier. (2017). “Des politiques blancs comme neige,” La Vie des Idées, May9, 2017, <http://laviedesidees.fr>.
7.
FlemingJenny and IanHolland. (2002). Motivating Ministers to Morality, Abingdon: Ashgate.
8.
FrançoisAbel and PhélippeauÉric. (2017). “Le financement des campagnes électorales,” in DeloyeYves and MayerNonna (eds.), Analyses électorales, Paris: Bruylant, 701–58.
9.
FrançoisAbel and PhélippeauÉric. (2018). “French Parties Funding,” in MendilowJonathan and PhélippeauÉric (eds.), Handbook of Political Party Funding, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 271–90.
10.
FrançoisAbel and ÉricPhélippeau. (2017). “Paraître transparent? Les usages des déclarations d'intérêts des maires des grandes villes françaises,” Communication to the 14th Congress of the French Political Science Association, ST 24, Transparency as Politics and Policy. Political Sociology of Practices and Tools of Government. Montpellier, July2017.
11.
GarrigouAlain. (1989). “Strategic Analysis of a Scandal: Carrefour du développement,” Corruption and Reform: An International Journal, vol.4, no.2,159–79.
12.
GreeneIan. (2006). “The Chrétien Ethics Legacy,” in HarderLois and PattenSteve (eds.), The Chrétien Legacy: Politics and Public Policy in Canada, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 276–299.
13.
GusfieldJoseph R. (1981). The Culture of Public Problems: Drinking-Driving and the Symbolic Order, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
14.
JohnstonMichael. (2014). Corruption, Contention and Reform: The Power of Deep Democratization, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
15.
JospinLionel. (2012). Pour un renouveau démocratique—Rapport de la Commission de rénovation et de déontologie de la vie publique. , Paris: La documentation Française.
16.
JuilletLuc and PhélippeauÉric. (2016). “Transparency as a Tool against Corruption: Conflict of Interest Reforms in Canada and France,” in Jonathan Mendilow and Ilan Peleg (eds.), Corruption and Governmental Legitimacy: A Twenty-First Century Perspective, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, Lexington Books,219–52.
17.
JuilletLuc. (2004). “The Office of Ethics Commissioner, Accountability and Public Trust,” in DoernG.B. (ed.), How Ottawa Spends: Mandate Change in the Paul Martin Era, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 296–316.
18.
JuilletLuc. (2008). “Dans l'ombre de Sharp: le parlementarisme et le rôle du Commissaire à l'éthique en matière d'éthique ministérielle,” Revue de droit parlementaire et politique, vol.1, 317–33.
19.
JuilletLuc. (2018). “Upholding Government Ethics: The Case of Preferential Treatment for Green Power Generation,” in ClarkeA. and CraftJ. (eds.), Issues in Canadian Governance, Toronto: Emond Publishing, 221–237.
20.
KanjiMebs. (2002). “Political Discontent, Human Capital, and Representative Governance in Canada,” in NevitteNeil (ed.), Value Change and Governance in Canada, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 79.
21.
KernaghanKen. (1973). “The Ethical Conduct of Canadian Public Servants,” Optimum, vol.4, no.3, 5–8.
22.
KingdonJohn. (1984). Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, Boston: Little, Brown & Co.
23.
LascoumesPierre. (2010). Favoritisme et corruption à la française: Petits arrangements avec la probité, Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
24.
LemariéAlexandre. (2017). “La déontologue de l'Assemblée critique la réforme des frais de mandat des deputes,” Le Monde (electronic edition), Dec.6, 2017.
25.
Mélin-SoucramanienFerdinand. (2015). Annual Public Report on the Implementation of the Code of Ethics Submitted to the President and the Office of the National Assembly by the Ethics Officer of the National Assembly, in Application of Article 80-3 of the Assembly's Procedures. June17, 2015.
26.
MonnierFrédéric. (2011). Corruption et politique: rien de nouveau?, Paris: Armand Colin.
27.
NadalJean-Louis. (2014). Renouer la confiance publique: Rapport au Président de la République sur l'exemplarité des responsables publics. , Paris: La documentation Française.
28.
NadalJean-Louis. (2015). “La majorité des responsables publics sont honnêtes,” Paris Match (electronic edition), Dec.31, 2015.
29.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Public Governance Committee. (2009). Towards a Sound Integrity Framework: Instruments, Processes, Structures and Conditions of Implementation, Paris, OECD.
30.
Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada. (2011). Administering the Lobbying Act: Observations and Recommendations Based on the Experience of the Last Five Years, Report presented to the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, Ottawa, Dec.13, 2011.
31.
Office of the Ethics and Conflict of Interest Commissioner. (2013). The Conflict of Interest Act: Five-Year Review, Submission to the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, Ottawa, Jan.30, 2013.
32.
Office of the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner of Canada. (2017). Review of the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act, Report submitted to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates, Ottawa, Feb.14, 2017.
33.
PhélippeauÉric. (2010). “The Genesis of a Codification: The Reform of French Political Finance and the Parliamentary Learning Process, 1970–1987,” Revue française de science politique (English edition), vol.60, no.2, 91–138.
34.
Piccio DanielaR. (2014). “A Self-Interested Legislator? Party Regulation in Italy,” South European Society and Politics, vol.19, no.1, 135–52.
35.
PiersonPaul. (2004). Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
36.
Pinto-DuschinskyMichael. (2002). “Financing Politics: A Global View,” Journal of Democracy, vol.13, no.4, 69–86.
37.
PujasVéronique and RhodesMartin. (1999). “Party Finance and Political Scandal in Italy, Spain and France,” West European Politics, vol.22, no.3, 41–63.
38.
RothsteinBo. (2011). The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in International Perspective, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
39.
RundquistBarry S., StromGerald S., and PetersJohn G.. (1977). “Corrupt Politicians and Their Electoral Support: Some Experimental Observations,” American Political Science Review, vol.71, no.3, 954–63.
40.
Saint-MartinDenis. (2009). “L'institutionnalisation d'un champ d'expertise contesté: la régulation de l'éthique parlementaire aux États-Unis et en Europe,” Cahiers internationaux de sociologie, no.126,21–37.
41.
Saint-MartinDenis and ThompsonFred (eds.). (2006). Public Ethics and Governance: Standards and Practices in Comparative Perspective. , Burlington: Elsevier.
42.
SauvéJean-Marc. (2011). Pour une nouvelle déontologie de la vie publique—Rapport de la Commission de réflexion pour la prévention des conflits d'intérêts dans la vie publique, Paris,:La documentation Française.
43.
SchuckNathalie. (2017). “Présidentielle 2017: Rififi à la Commission des comptes de champagne,” Le Parisien (electronic edition), Jan.7, 2018.
44.
SmithJennifer and BakvisHerman. (2002). “Canadian General Elections and the Money Question,” in CrossW. (ed.), Political Parties, Representation, and Electoral Democracy in Canada, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 132–144.
45.
StanburyW.T. (1996). “Regulating the Financing of Federal Parties and Candidates,” in TanguayA.B. and GagnonA.G. (eds.), Canadian Parties in Transition, 2nd ed., Toronto: Nelson Canada, 371–422.
46.
WoodAbby K. and SpencerDouglas M.. (2016). “In the Shadow of Sunlight: The Effects of Transparency on State Political Campaigns,” Election Law Journal, vol.15, no.4, 302–29.
