Lessons for Sub-Saharan Africa from Kenya on Electoral Reforms: The Role and Limitations of the Law

Abstract

Abstract

This article evaluates the significance of law reform as an instrument of securing electoral processes in Africa against pathological influences. It demonstrates that through change of law, most ruling regimes in post-colonial Africa frustrated electoral processes, and hence that law reform has the potential of creating an environment for reversing the effects of autocratic regimes on electoral practices. It does, however, also demonstrate that despite a robust law reform agenda in most African countries, electoral processes are still controlled by ruling regimes because there are numerous factors that influence the working of institutions entrusted with democratic processes. Its empirical focus is Kenya. Like many other countries in Africa, Kenya amended its constitution in the early 1990s and has since been engaged in numerous constitutional reform exercises—including the 2010 constitutional substitution—aimed at creating an independent institution and empowering courts as arbiters of electoral disputes. However, there is evidence, after almost every general election, that the structures of law aimed at setting, mechanizing, and enforcing electoral process standards have not been shielded from other factors at play that influence the very working of institutions and enforcement of standards that the law sets. In the end, it seems that resorting to law reform alone can result in an unsuccessful bid at ensuring integrity and legitimacy of electoral processes.