Considering the Appropriateness of State Regulation of Intra-Party Democracy: A Comparative Politics Perspective

Abstract

Abstract

This article considers the appropriateness of state regulation of the internal decision-making processes and organizational structures of political parties. After reviewing the most common arguments made in support of state regulation, the article takes a political science perspective in examining both the practical and democratic implications of such regulation with a focus on parties' internal decision making. While state mandates are often an impulsive response to identified shortcomings in the ways parties operate, I argue here that regulation potentially comes with significant costs to the democratic operation of parties and the role they play in state-wide democracy more broadly. Regulation of the internal functions of parties challenges their role as civil society organizations operating independent of the state. It also dampens opportunity for diversity and experimentation in democratic practice and prioritizes some democratic values over others. State regulation also potentially deprives party activists of a meaningful say in the way their party is organized and thus makes participation in parties less attractive. The article concludes that beyond expressing a preference for parties to operate in a “democratic” fashion, the internal workings of parties may best be exempt from state regulation and left to the discretion of the parties themselves.