Abstract
Abstract
The major objective of party finance laws is to create equitable, free, and fair party competition in which the true popularity of policy proposals matter most for electoral outcomes. But to what extent have party finance laws encouraged homogenous financial conditions for fair party competition? This article draws on the level playing field conception prominent in theories of egalitarianism and tests the assumption that party finance regulation eliminates or reduces inequalities arising from unequal starting points. It analyzes data on the party finances of 47 parties in six European countries between 1960 and 2010. The findings indicate that party finance law has been effective in some countries. Specifically, despite significant legislative differences, the introduction of party finance law in Denmark and the Netherlands was most effective in encouraging financial convergence amongst parties and thus more similar financial conditions. The findings suggest that party finance regulation has not always accomplished creating a level playing field; wherever it did, quite different structures achieved similar outcomes. When it comes to party finance regulation there appears to be no one-size-fits-all policy to create equal opportunities between parties.
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