Abstract
Abstract
As the dust settles on the post-2010 census redistricting round across the United States, reform groups are focused on legislative change. They aim for a redistricting process which would generate a fair map, one likely to advantage neither party at subsequent elections. In pursuit of this objective several U.S. states have delegated their redistricting powers to independent authorities, and maps come into effect without the need for the legislature's approval. But those independent authorities will not automatically come to agreement on a map that is any fairer than a legislature might draw, so some states direct the process via restrictive criteria. Several states require that districts not be drawn to give an advantage to an incumbent, political candidate, or political party. The reformers focus on legislatures because the U.S. Supreme Court has never been able to invalidate a map as an egregious gerrymander. The court has recognized that redistricting is a political process and therefore a degree of political advantage is likely to be built into any map, and it has been unable to derive a standard for fairness from the Constitution. But the Florida Supreme Court has recently ruled that legislators can be required to show whether, in drawing their map, they took into account factors which would have had the effect of advantaging one party or incumbents. What has never been established by the courts, though it seems relatively settled now within academic circles, is how a map can be assessed.
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