A Public Finance Model for Lobbying: Lobbying,Campaign Finance,and the Privatization of Democracy

Abstract

Abstract

This paper argues that there are deep continuities between lobbying and campaign finance, all of which stem from the fact that we have “privatized” an essentially public function. In the United States, two of the most important activities a democracy requires to function – funding campaigns and providing the information necessary to legislate – are largely carried out by private actors. The paper argues that the constitutional obstacles to regulation in both areas are similar precisely because both activities fall in roughly the same place on the public/private continuum. Once we understand lobbying and campaign finance regulations to be addressing the same kind of problem, we can apply the insights from one domain to the other. In keeping with this view, the paper proposes a “leveling-up” approach to lobbying, one that uses public funds to reduce legislators' susceptibility to the disproportionate influence of private monies. This “public finance” analog for lobbying satisfies existing constitutional constraints while mitigating some of the inequities in our current system.