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Abstract

The Guidelines for Biosafety Training Programs for Workers Assigned to BSL-3 Research Laboratories were developed by biosafety professionals who oversee training programs for the 2 national biocontainment laboratories (NBLs) and the 13 regional biocontainment laboratories (RBLs) that participate in the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) NBL/RBL Network. These guidelines provide a general training framework for biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) high-containment laboratories, identify key training concepts, and outline training methodologies designed to standardize base knowledge, understanding, and technical competence of laboratory personnel working in high-containment laboratories. Emphasis is placed on building a culture of risk assessment–based safety through competency training designed to enhance understanding and recognition of potential biological hazards as well as methods for controlling these hazards. These guidelines may be of value to other institutions and academic research laboratories that are developing biosafety training programs for BSL-3 research.

The guidelines that have been developed for workers in BSL-3 laboratories provide a training framework, identify training concepts, and outline methods designed to standardize base knowledge, understanding, and technical competence of lab personnel working in high-containment laboratories. Emphasis is placed on building a culture of risk assessment–based safety through competency training designed to enhance understanding and recognition of potential biological hazards and methods for controlling these hazards.

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