All of the costs associated with decontamination following the 2001 anthrax letter attacks were summarized, estimated, and aggregated based on existing literature and news media reports. A comprehensive list of all affected structures was compiled. Costs were analyzed by building class and decontamination type. Sampling costs and costs of worker relocation were also included. Our analysis indicates that the total cost associated with decontamination was about $320 million.
Using the existing literature and news media reports about the decontamination efforts following the 2001 anthrax attacks, the authors analyzed the total cost of decontamination and estimated it to be about $320 million.
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