Environmental Decontamination Following a Large-Scale Bioterrorism Attack: Federal Progress and Remaining Gaps

Abstract

Decontamination of facilities following the 2001 anthrax attacks proved to be both costly and time-consuming, even given the limited scope of the attacks. A widespread biological attack could be much more expensive to handle, but our federal policies are still lagging. This article identifies gaps in decontamination policy and offers practical recommendations for improvement.

The process of environmental decontamination is a key step in a successful response to a large-scale attack involving a biological agent. Costs for the decontamination response following the 2001 anthrax attacks were estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars, and some facilities could not be reopened for more than 2 years. However, a large-scale biological attack would likely result in an even greater amount of contamination, more areas that need to be cleaned and made safe, and a much greater cost to the American public. This article identifies gaps in decontamination policy and technical practice at the federal level and provides practical recommendations that will better enable the U.S. to undertake a biological decontamination response.